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I. INTRODUCTION
In the immortal words of Vice President Joe Biden, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act1 (“ACA” or the “Act”) is a “big f---ing deal.”2 It accomplishes the United States’ most
sweeping reform of healthcare law and our greatest expansion of healthcare access since the
1965 enactment of Medicare3 and Medicaid.4 Nevertheless, the ACA leaves a few things to be
desired. Like many sweeping reforms, the Act entrusts large swaths of its implementation to the
states. This Article argues, from a purely functional perspective, that the federalist structure in
the ACA is a mistake. Healthcare regulation in the modern age should be a national project
entrusted solely to the central government.5
Our concern here is not with constitutional limits on national or state authority. Although
such limits undoubtedly exist and although those limits are certainly important, this Article will
focus on the functional advantages that the state governments on the one hand and the national
government on the other6 can bring to healthcare regulation. Our concern is not, for example,
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be
codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
2
Nick Graham, ‘A Big F---ing Deal’: Biden’s Health Care Reform F-Bomb on Live TV
(VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2010, 12:24 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/23/a-big-fucking-deal-bidens_n_509927.html.
3
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006).
4
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
5
For the sake of clarity and consistency, we will use “national government” or “central
government” rather than “federal government” to refer to Congress, the presidency, and the
Article III judiciary. We will use “federal” and “federalism” to refer to a system comprised of
one national government and several sub-national governments, in this case one national
government and fifty state governments.
6
See generally Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Federalism, (Illinois
Law and Econ. Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. LE06-001, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=875626.
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whether the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause7 or
whether the Medicaid expansion represents an unconstitutional commandeering of state
agencies.8 Instead, it is whether the ACA’s private insurance regulations, public insurance
provisions, and health and wellness incentives would be best managed at the state or national
level. Assuming that the goals of controlling the costs of medical care, expanding Americans’
access to healthcare coverage, and bolstering the quality of medical interventions are worthy
goals, who should be in charge of overseeing them? Should it be the state governments, the
national government, or some combination of the two?
Early in this nation’s history, our resounding answer was that healthcare and public
health regulations should be left exclusively to the states.9 In the New Deal and Great Society
movements, however, the national government intervened in many areas of state control,
including healthcare,10 and the emergent healthcare regulatory system has been one of mixed and
often confused authority. Only a handful of healthcare programs, most notably Medicare11 and
the Military Health System (“MHS”),12 are governed exclusively at the national level, while
countless others, including Medicaid,13 the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(“SCHIP”),14 and the vast majority of private health insurance regulations,15 are governed jointly
or, perhaps more accurately, disjointedly at the national and state levels.
7

See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 40 (2009) (discussing constitutional question of compulsory health insurance
prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act and finding that it would be valid under
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers); David B. Rivkin Jr., Lee A. Casey & Jack M. Balkin, A
Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 93 (2009) (debating the constitutionality of the individual mandate); Virginia v.
Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (finding the individual mandate is an
unconstitutional exercise of the commerce clause as regulating “inactivity”); Elizabeth Weeks
Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform,
HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1663947 (discussing
the health reform nullification movement). See generally Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10 Civ. 188 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.oag.state.va.us/PRESS_RELEASES/Cuccinelli/Comm%20v.%20Sebelius%20%20Complaint%20filed%20with%20Court%20_323_10.pdf; see also Complaint, Florida v.
Sebelius, (N.D. Fla. March 23, 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-91) (complaint includes 13 states),
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/florida/flndce/3:2010cv00091/57507/1/.
8
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Virginia v. Sebelius (2010) (No. 3:10 Civ.
91) (alleging that Medicaid expansion and requirements for state-run health insurance exchanges
and high risk pools violate the Tenth Amendment by “commandeering the [states] and their
employees as agents of the federal government’s regulatory scheme at the states’ own cost.”).
9
See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
10
See id. at 235–90, 367–74.
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42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006).
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See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071–1110 (2006).
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42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
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42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (2006).
15
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006)
(preempting state regulation of employer provided benefits including health benefits); see
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Part of the reason that lawmakers have chosen “cooperative federalism”16—or this
disjointed mess—is that Congress is self-consciously a federalist institution. Despite being the
lawmaking body for the central government (or perhaps, from the Framers’ perspective, because
it is the lawmaking body for a central government17), Congress is structured to be protective of
states’ interests. The Senate in particular embodies the Founders’ state-protective instinct,
providing each state with equal representation notwithstanding their wildly varying
populations.18 It is therefore structurally difficult to pass legislation that would centralize
regulatory authority in the national government at the expense of state control. This story of
senatorial protection for federalism certainly played out in the ACA’s passage; the House version
of the bill would have centralized regulatory authority far more than the enacted Senate bill did.
Our problem with this structural story and with the legislation that results from it is that
the modern era of law and regulation is dramatically different from that of the founding. In a
largely technocratic age, in which regulation centers increasingly on data and analysis and in
which data flow instantaneously and human beings flow quickly across state borders, the
functional advantages of state and local regulation have all but disappeared. This is especially
true in a field like healthcare, which benefits significantly from aggregation of information
across large numbers of people—which benefits from economies of scale. Additionally, in an
era of increasingly data-driven regulation, the central government is capable of capturing many
of the historic advantages of state and local regulation without leaving any implementation
generally THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., HOW PRIVATE HEALTH COVERAGE WORKS: A
PRIMER 2008 UPDATE (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7766.pdf
(providing an overview of state licensing procedures and competing federal regulation
preempting state control); MILA KOFMAN & KAREN POLLITZ, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HEALTH
POLICY INSTITUTE, HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION BY STATES AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: A REVIEW OF CURRENT APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 1, (2006),
available at
http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/HealthInsuranceReportKofmanandPollitz-95.pdf
(discussing the divide between federal and state regulatory powers prior to the enactment of the
Health Insurance Marketplace Modernization and Affordability Act); Russell Korobkin, The
Battle over Self-insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves Another”, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89 (2005) (describing ERISA preemption and the differing standards
regulating private and self-insurers).
16
See generally Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459, 479-82 (1938)
(introducing a symposium on “cooperative federalism”); see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard,
State Constitutionalism and the Right to Healthcare, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1338 (2010)
(cooperative federalism programs are those in which a state “receive[s] a percentage-on-thedollar match from the federal government for every state dollar spent.”); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983) (discussing the
desirability of cooperation through federal funding programs vis-à-vis preemption or
commandeering state officials).
17
See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 359 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966).
18
See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 547–48
(1954).
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authority to the state governments. Because data-driven regulation is largely objectivist, the
national government can run policy experiments that tell us as much as or even more than statebased experimentation; it can gather variegated data on local policy preferences; and it can vary
policy implementation to respond to those preferences.
The ACA recognizes much of this modern story by placing national agencies at the
forefront of implementing healthcare reform. But in several significant respects, the Act falls
short of centralizing regulatory authority in the national government. It leaves states responsible
for implementing the insurance exchanges, the general regulations of private insurance, the
Medicaid and SCHIP programs, and several demonstration projects.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II makes the case that the national government is
functionally superior to state and local governments for healthcare regulation in the modern age.
Part III considers the successes and failures of the ACA in centralizing healthcare regulation.
Part IV concludes.
II. FUNCTIONAL FEDERALISM AND HEALTHCARE REGULATION
There are a number of purely functional factors that one can consider when choosing
between state and national governments for regulating healthcare. Each level of government
captures different advantages, and each suffers from different disadvantages. In analyzing
functional rather than constitutional federalism, scholars generally consider the following
factors: (1) experimentation, (2) voice, (3) diversity, (4) exit, (5) uniformity, (6) scale, (7)
spillover prevention, and (8) redistribution.19 The first four factors represent advantages of
smaller governments; the latter four represent advantages of the national government.
This part will briefly describe each of the functional factors, positing first, that the
national government’s advantages are particularly important for healthcare regulation and,
second, that the national government can (and sometimes does) design healthcare regulations to
recapture many of the states’ functional advantages without using state governments for
implementation.
A. The Functional Factors
1. Advantages of State and Local Governance
a. Experimentation
Experimentation—the ability of states to act as laboratories of democracy20—is
probably the most frequently invoked functional advantage of state governance.21 In a federal
system, the smaller units of government—in our case the states—can run live tests of different
policy approaches. The national government can then see which approaches work and which
don’t and can choose whether or not to enact a successful approach nationwide. If policy leaders
hypothesize, for example, that capping noneconomic and punitive damages in medical
19

See generally Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 6; Scott L. Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health
Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 203 (2010).
20
New Ice State Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21
See, e.g., Craig Volden, State as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s
Health Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294 (2006); Charles Fried, Federalism—Why
Should We Care?, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1982).
4

malpractice litigation will reduce the practice of defensive medicine, will curb inflation in
liability insurance, or will improve the quality of medical care, then they can convince a handful
of representative states, say California and Texas, to enact such caps. They can then see what
actually happens. If the caps work to accomplish the stated goals, then other states’ legislators
can enact the same caps, or Congress can enact them nationwide.22 If the caps do not work,
policymakers can try a different approach elsewhere. State governance thus provides
information about the usefulness of a given policy approach.
b.
Voice
The second advantage of small government is that state and local representatives have
fewer constituents than national representatives, allowing them to gather more and better
information about their electorates’ policy preferences. If smaller governments are directly
involved in shaping and implementing policy, then each constituent will have greater voice in
that project. If, by contrast, the national government is solely responsible for policymaking, the
smallest constituent group will be about 560,000 people, the size of the smallest congressional
district in the House of Representatives.23 No matter how conscientious, a single representative
cannot communicate effectively with that many people about their specific policy preferences.
c.
Diversity and Exit
The third and fourth advantages of state involvement in policy implementation—
diversity and exit—are closely related. State or local governmental control has the advantage of
allowing policy diversity within a single country. Diversity of this kind has two beneficial
effects.24 First, it allows states to fine-tune their policies to the specific needs of their
constituencies, in case the citizens of Texas have different needs and preferences on a given
policy question than the citizens of California. This is a straightforward advantage of diversity.
Second, policy diversity allows residents to exit one jurisdiction in favor of another, thereby
facilitating competition among the states for resident taxpayers—a theoretical advantage first
advanced by Charles Tiebout.25 Under the Tiebout theory of federalism, the states’ diversity of
policy approaches allows taxpayers to choose among different bundles of taxes and services by
“voting with their feet,” creating a market-like environment that will theoretically result in
optimal policy bundles.26 In other words, states will compete for taxpayers by setting policy
according to constituents’ preferences, and the constituent population that stays in a given state
(rather than moving) will be the population that gains the most value from the policy bundle
offered.27 If, by contrast, the national government is solely responsible for setting policy and it
chooses a monolithic policy bundle for the entire country, then citizens are stuck. The cost of

22

The process of state mimicry of successful policy is known as “policy diffusion” and is an oftstudied phenomenon in political science.
23
If apportioned correctly, each congressional district should contain about 690,000 people, or
300 million people divided into 435 districts. The state of Wyoming, however, has one
representative despite having a total population of about 560,000 people. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
RESIDENT POPULATION CHANGE (2010).
24
See Greer & Jacobson, supra note 19, at 214.
25
See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
26
Id.
27
See generally id.
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exit in that case—the cost of moving out of the country—is significantly higher than the cost of
moving to a different state within the United States.
2. Advantages of National Governance
a.

Uniformity
Perhaps the best-known and most frequently invoked advantage of national regulation
is uniformity: the ability of the national government to set consistent standards nationwide.
Uniformity is particularly important when regulated interests, such as manufacturers or
employers, operate in several states or nationwide. In that case, state control would force multistate entities to learn and to comply with up to fifty different sets of rules. Uniformity
significantly decreases the costs of compliance.
b.
Scale
A second advantage of national governance is that it benefits from economies of
scale. The term “economies of scale” refers to the cost advantages of expansion or increased
production.28 For a standard corporation, the cost per unit of production might go down as the
corporation produces more units, especially if the corporation experiences high fixed costs. For
government, the same phenomenon might occur if the cost per instance of regulation decreases
as the number of regulated individuals increases. Furthermore, government frequently acts like a
private corporation or private business, providing goods and services directly, either at taxpayer
expense or on a fee-for-service basis. In that case, public programs might benefit from
economies of scale for exactly the same reasons that private corporations would: the cost of
producing public goods might decrease as the number of units produced increases. For public
regulations and public goods that benefit from scale, putting the national government in charge
has the obvious advantage of increasing the regime’s or program’s size relative to any given
state’s population.
c.
Spillover Prevention
The third advantage of national control is really a justification for federal
intervention—a correction of diseased state governance rather than a true virtue of national
governance. The states are sometimes able to externalize the negative effects of their regulatory
regimes, distorting their regulatory incentives, and the national government can correct that
distortion. The best example of this spillover problem is environmental regulation; the negative
effects of under-regulating environmental harms often flow downstream to neighboring states.
This problem is the one that gives rise to “races to the bottom” in state regulation.29 Although
the national government might also be able to externalize costs onto neighbors—in this case
neighboring countries—the national government certainly internalizes more of its own costs than
any given state. In a regulatory regime that experiences spillover effects, therefore, the national
government might be better motivated to regulate well.
d.
Redistribution
28

See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 85–88 (4th ed. 2005).
29
See Frank J. Thompson, New Federalism and Health Care Policy: States and the Old
Questions, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 6470 (1986); see also Dale B. Thompson, Optimal
Federalism Across Institutions: Theory and Applications From Environmental and Health Care
Policies, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 437, 444 (2009) (discussing how uniform federal regulation
“protects states from ruinous competition”).
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The final advantage of national regulation is its ability to redistribute resources from
richer to poorer states. In policy regimes in which voters believe that all Americans should
receive a minimum floor of public goods or services, the national government can play a role in
helping the poorer states to reach that floor.
B. The Functional Federalism of Healthcare
What, then, are the factors that matter most for healthcare regulation? Although
American “healthcare regulation” is far from monolithic, we propose that economies of scale,
redistribution, and perhaps spillover problems are important throughout the healthcare regulatory
complex. Scale, we argue, is the single most important functional factor for every regulatory
question that falls under the broad umbrella of “healthcare,” and redistribution seems universally
relevant because most Americans seem to believe that all citizens should receive a minimum
floor of healthcare coverage.30 Spillovers might also be universally important, depending on the
empirical reality of the “snowball effect,”31 and spillovers are probably at least sometimes
relevant, regardless of whether or not the snowball effect is real. Finally, uniformity is
sometimes but not always important in healthcare.
It is also true, of course, that policy diversity, voice, and experimentation are often, if not
always, important to healthcare. Those functional values could be protected through cooperative
federalist programs that would capture benefits of scale, redistribution, and spillover prevention
while relying on state implementation to accomplish diversity, voice, and experimentation. We
propose, however, that healthcare regulation will work better if, instead of relying on state
implementation to get diversity, voice, and experimentation, the national government simply
diversifies its own policy implementation to suit local needs, invests in accurate information
about local preferences, and runs its own experiments to test new policy proposals, all of which
are things that the central government does in the Medicare program.32
1. National Advantages in Healthcare
a.

Scale
Healthcare regulation, like many other regulatory regimes, has become increasingly
objectivist and data-driven over the last several decades. As such, the greatest need is not for
voice or diversity—two important factors in subjectivist regulation, which depend on people’s
preferences—but rather for scale to gather reliable data. That is, in an objectivist regulatory
world, where regulatory decision-making depends on cost-benefit and welfare analyses, the
single greatest need is for information. This is particularly true in healthcare, where the market
failures that justify government intervention center on informational problems. Healthcare is a
credence good, meaning that consumers have a hard time evaluating the quality of healthcare
goods both before and after consumption, and it is a good for which there are often asymmetries
of information between buyers and sellers. In a market with these particular failures,
30

Several healthcare programs embody and reveal this collective belief, including the recent
push for universal insurance through the ACA as well as several older public insurance programs
such as Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP.
31
See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical
Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 889 (2009) [hereinafter Moncrieff,
Federalization Snowballs].
32
See infra Part II.A.3.
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government plays a useful role in regulating quality to protect consumers and in gathering and
distributing information to help smooth asymmetries. Both of these regulatory projects—both
quality control and information provision—are fundamentally objectivist and data-driven
projects.33
But the information on which these projects must rely, namely information about health
and medicine, is extremely costly to gather, and it is unreliable if data are gathered from small
groups. For example, one individual’s bad experience with a balloon catheter (a medical device
used in heart surgery)34 tells us very little about the overall quality of the device, and it tells us
very little about the quality of the surgeon who used it. Perhaps the device is inherently faulty
and will harm other patients, but perhaps the individual catheter malfunctioned on a fluke.35
Perhaps the surgeon is usually sloppy and will harm future patients, or maybe the surgeon made
an uncharacteristic mistake. Or maybe the individual patient simply could not be helped.36
Regulators will not be able to draw reliable conclusions about the device or the surgeon from a
single datum.
Instead, in order to reach firm conclusions on which regulators can base their decisions,
policymakers need to gather data from many different stories. Regulators need to know what
happens when other surgeons use the balloon catheter to know whether the catheter suffers from
a design or labeling defect. They need to know what happens when the same surgeon uses other
devices on other patients to know whether the surgeon presents a safety threat. And they need to
know what happens when other patients interact with the same catheter and the same surgeon to
make sure that it isn’t some combination of the catheter and the surgeon that presents a danger.
The more stories regulators can collect, the more reliable their conclusions will become.
Furthermore, this same need for aggregated data holds for other goals of healthcare regulation,
including cost control and access expansion. Across a wide range of healthcare regulations,
government benefits from scale—from the authority to gather information about many people
from many sources.
In addition to the regulatory need for data, scale is a significant advantage for public
provision of healthcare because larger groups are more efficient at sharing risk. The American
healthcare regulatory complex largely centers not on interventionist regulation—not on exercises
of police power to control cost, quality, and access—but rather on public provision of health
insurance. That is, a large portion of the government’s impact on healthcare markets occurs
through Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP. In those programs, the scale advantages of risk
pooling become extremely important; public insurance, like private insurance, will be cheaper
per person as more people join the pool. A nationwide program like Medicare, thus, will be
cheaper than a state-based program like Medicaid, even if all administrative decisions and costs
are held constant between the two programs (obviously a counterfactual assumption).
b.
Redistribution

33

See generally Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why (and
How) it Might be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323 (2010) [hereinafter Moncrieff,
Assault on Litigation].
34
See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 312 (2008).
35
See Moncrieff, Assault on Litigation, supra note 33, at 2365–67 (detailing a fuller explanation
of information costs).
36
Id. at 2365–66.
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The other functional factor that seems important to healthcare regulation as a whole is
redistribution. Although this point rests on a subjective judgment that might be controversial,
there seems to be broad agreement among American voters that all citizens are entitled to a
minimum baseline of adequate healthcare.37 Certainly, this sentiment underlies the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”),38 which requires trauma centers, as a
condition of Medicare participation, to stabilize any patient regardless of ability to pay.39 And
this sentiment justifies public insurance programs for the poor, including Medicaid and SCHIP,
which provide baseline coverage to those who are unable to pay. If it is true that voters
collectively prefer to guarantee baseline coverage for all Americans, then it makes sense to have
the national government play a role in redistributing resources from richer states to poorer states
in order to help the poorer states meet that baseline.
Redistribution is also particularly important for programs that need to be countercyclical—programs that should spend more when the economy is weaker. Most states have
balanced budget requirements and therefore tend not to deficit spend during weak economies,
while the federal government, which has no such requirement, can spend beyond its means
during economic downturns.40 For much of healthcare, this advantage of national control is
irrelevant given that most healthcare costs are not counter-cyclical. But public insurance for the
poor is. Medicaid, thus, benefits significantly from national contributions because more people
will be eligible for the program during tough economic times than during strong economic times.
Deficit spending might therefore be necessary for Medicaid.
c.
Spillover Prevention
According to Professor Moncrieff’s snowball theory, the national government has
created a perpetual spillover problem in healthcare by adopting national insurance programs and
tax incentives by which the central government bears a substantial portion of the costs of
healthcare consumption.41 Because the national government pays for about forty percent of
healthcare consumption, the states externalize a significant portion of their costs when they under
regulate or over regulate healthcare in a way that drives up healthcare consumption.42 For
example, if a state enacts a policy that increases healthcare consumption by one hundred dollars,
the state will pay only sixty dollars of that cost. This financial structure distorts the states’
incentives to keep consumption-related spending low. While this problem certainly exists in
theory, it is not clear whether it actually influences the states’ decision-making. If it does, then
only a full national takeover would fix the problem.43

37

See Aimee Miles, Public Doesn’t Support Cuts to Health Care Programs, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/January/25/kff-harvardpoll.aspx (showing that a majority of Americans support continued funding for medical
entitlement programs).
38
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).
39
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).
40
See generally GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE
EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1993), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/d44t15/148877.pdf.
41
Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs, supra note 31, at 848–49.
42
Id. at 861–65.
43
See generally id. at 868–72, 881.
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Even if snowballing does not actually occur, there are other, more traditional spillovers
that seem to infect some healthcare regulations. For example, states might not have a full
incentive to provide healthcare for the sick and the poor if their sick and poor constituents will
move to more generous states. In other words, states might be able to externalize the costs of
under-providing public insurance for the poor if their citizens are mobile. On the other side,
states might externalize the benefits if they do provide such insurance because healed
constituents might leave the state’s economy after benefiting from public insurance. In short, the
citizenry’s mobility might cause healthcare costs and benefits to spill over from state to state.
This problem might cause a traditional “race to the bottom” in public insurance for the poor in
the absence of national involvement.
d.
Uniformity
The most famous justification for national governance is probably the least relevant
functional federalism factor in the healthcare regime. Only for employer-sponsored insurance
(“ESI”) does uniformity seem to be a compelling need. For ESI, employers that operate across
state lines benefit from uniform regulations of health insurance—a benefit that is embodied in
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)44 and to a lesser extent in the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).45 In the actual practice of
medicine, however, there are few entities that operate across state lines; doctors and hospitals
tend to practice in single jurisdictions. In the individual and small group markets for health
insurance, only a handful of national companies sell policies in multiple states. For the most
part, then, uniformity is not a compelling need in the modern healthcare market. That said, the
benefits of scale would apply to private health insurance as well as public, and if the regulatory
regime were uniform, more national insurance companies might emerge and might be able to sell
cheaper policies on the small group and individual markets—one of the goals of the ACA’s
insurance exchanges.
2. State Advantages in Healthcare
a.

Experimentation
The most significant benefit of state involvement in healthcare is experimentation.
As noted above, the greatest need in healthcare regulation is for information, and one invaluable
means of generating information is through real-world experimentation. If the states choose
different policy approaches to manage the costs of, quality of, and access to healthcare, then
regulators might learn which approaches work and which do not. At a minimum, regulators
would learn more through the states’ various attempts than they ever could from a single,
uniform national policy.
There are, however, limits to the usefulness of state-based experiments. The biggest such
limit is the demographic and sociological diversity among the states, which frustrates attempts to
draw causal conclusions about the legal and policy approaches tried. In other words, California’s
experience with damages caps for medical malpractice does not tell us enough about Vermont’s
likely experience with the exact same caps. It is too difficult (if not impossible) to regress out
the countless variables that distinguish California from Vermont, many of which might matter to
the medical malpractice environment.
44

See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006).
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in various sections of titles 18, 29, 42, and 26 of the U.S.C.).
45
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A second important limit is the insufficiency of one state’s incentive to gather, keep, and
distribute reliable data about its own experiences with its own policy choices. If California
gathered and kept such data, it might benefit the state to some extent, but California itself could
probably draw conclusions by observation, without detailed data or analysis. The benefit of such
investment in useable data, thus, would accrue primarily to other states and to the central
government.46 California cannot recapture those externalized benefits, as by selling its data, and
it therefore has an incomplete incentive to invest in the relevant information. This problem is
essentially a spillover problem that justifies some national involvement.
b.
Voice
Two aspects of modern regulation render voice less important than it used to be as an
advantage of state government. First, the increasingly objectivist nature of healthcare regulation
diminishes the traditional importance of voice in regulatory decision-making. Second, the
increasing ease of communication makes small constituencies less necessary for capturing the
benefits of voice. If voters’ subjective preferences are not driving policy, then there is no need to
place policy-making responsibility in the hands of a government that is particularly responsive to
those preferences. Large government can do a fine job—indeed, a better job given the scale
advantages identified above—of collecting the information that is relevant to objectivist
regulation. Nevertheless, there are certainly some healthcare regulations that depend—or should
depend—on subjective preference, including basic willingness to pay for various kinds of
healthcare goods, and for those aspects of healthcare regulation, voice might be important.
Furthermore, even for objectivist regulation, smaller governments might be better at the on-theground project of gathering data and information. But with modern communications technology,
information about local needs and preferences no longer depends on physical closeness to the
information source. The federal government, thus, might be able to replicate state advantages,
though there is still an argument to be made that state governments have stronger electoral
incentives to pay attention to local needs and preferences.
c.
Diversity and Exit
As with voice, diversity and exit seem less important in a world of objectivist
regulation. In such an objectivist world, local preferences are less important than local needs,
and needs seem less likely than preferences to diverge on a state-by-state basis. Nonetheless,
there might be divergent needs among states, and there might be aspects of healthcare regulation
that ought to depend on preference. For example, perhaps state populations should be free to
decide—independently of other states’ preferences—how much they are willing to spend on
public healthcare; that might be a legitimate variable preference. It is certainly true that the cost
of healthcare varies geographically, meaning that even uniform public insurance programs will
have variable financial needs. At a minimum, different states have different demographic
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characteristics, and those characteristics might be relevant to both healthcare preferences and
healthcare needs. As such—and particularly given the absence of a compelling need for
uniformity in healthcare—the national government might want to allow divergences of
healthcare policy across the country.
The exit-based advantages of policy diversity might also hold for healthcare regulation,
though the existence of spillovers and the potential for races to the bottom undercut that point. If
taxpayers are likely to leave states with generous public benefits for the poor and the sick, the
competition among states for those taxpayers will result in too little public assistance relative to
whatever the optimal level might be. That said, national control of healthcare certainly would
decrease exit opportunities if the central government set a uniform policy nationwide.
3. Capturing and Improving on State Advantages through National Regulation
Given the virtues that the states can bring to the project of healthcare regulation—
however limited they might be—our readers might wonder why we advocate complete
nationalization of healthcare policy. At a minimum, our arguments so far support a role for state
implementation so that states can diversify and experiment at the margins. This “cooperative
federalist” model is, in fact, the one that Congress has chosen for Medicaid, for which the
national government sets a host of standards but allows states flexibility in complying with those
standards and even allows states to violate some such standards if granted a waiver for
experimentation. The ACA expanded this particular cooperative federalist structure in its
Medicaid provisions and relied on a similar federalist structure for the exchanges.47
Importantly, though, Medicaid is not the only national healthcare program that runs
experiments or that responds to local needs and preferences. Medicare does, too. It just does so
without relying on state agencies for any policy design or implementation. The Medicare
program frequently runs demonstration projects to experiment with new policy ideas, and its
local fiscal intermediaries make diversified decisions about coverage and compensation to meet
differing local needs.48 Furthermore, Medicare can redistribute, diversify, and experiment on a
more fine-tuned basis than the states because it is not governed by state boundaries; it can run
single programs for constituencies that stretch across state lines just as easily as it can run
programs for sub-constituencies within a given state, for state-wide constituencies, or for the
national constituency. And, of course, this national program does a better job than Medicaid of
capturing economies of scale, redistributing resources across state lines, avoiding spillover
effects in its regulatory decisions, and achieving uniformity of standards where necessary or
appropriate. In short, Medicare is a compelling model for a fully national healthcare program
that captures many advantages of state governance. Furthermore, because the national
government can run localized programs without the arbitrary constraints of state borders and can
govern regulatory regimes with a fully internalized incentive to gather and keep detailed
information, the national government certainly has a greater capacity—a greater theoretical
ability—in the modern objectivist world to capture the benefits traditionally ascribed to state
governance.
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III. THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE ACA
This section uses the functional federalism analysis to evaluate four key parts of the
ACA: the health and wellness incentives, the Medicaid expansion, the new regulations of private
insurance, and the establishment of insurance exchanges. In each area, the ACA increased
national control relative to the pre-ACA world. Yet because many of the new programs follow
the “cooperative federalism” model, they fall short of national governance while gaining few
state advantages in return. Worse still, the ACA replicated and extended the same “cooperative
federalism” headaches of the past, despite the fact the 111th Congress apparently recognized
these potential problems.49 From a functional federalism standpoint, future congresses should fix
these errors and further centralize healthcare regulation.
A. Health and Wellness Incentives
The ACA takes a decidedly national approach toward promoting wellness that, in our
view, succeeds under the functional federalism framework. The wellness incentives in the ACA
include menu labeling requirements, data gathering, and project grants for redistribution and
experimentation.
In an effort to fight obesity and to create greater awareness for healthy diets, the ACA
ushers in national menu labeling requirements for restaurants and retail food establishments with
twenty or more locations.50 These restaurants are now required to display “in a clear and
conspicuous manner” the caloric content of each item as well as the suggested daily calorie
intake.51 These restaurants must also have standard nutritional information about their food
items available to their consumers in written form and on their premises.52 Because the menulabeling requirement applies to chain restaurants, regulatory uniformity provides at least some
advantage because there is no need to suffer compliance costs from variable policies across state
lines . Thus, the nationalizing of menu labeling is an appropriate measure.
The ACA also seeks to improve public health by leveraging the national government’s
scale to uncover the nation’s healthcare disparities through data collection and dissemination.
Starting in 2012, “any federally conducted or supported health care or public program, activity,
or survey” must “collect and report, to the extent practicable, (A) data on race, ethnicity, sex,
primary language, and disability status for applicants, recipients, or participants, (B) data at the
smallest geographic level such as State, local, or institutional levels if such data can be
aggregated, (C) sufficient data to generate statistically reliable estimates . . . [of] subgroups for
applicants, recipients, or participants,” and (D) “any other demographic data as deemed
appropriate” by the Secretary of the Health and Human Services (“HHS”) regarding health
disparities.53 Any data collected regarding racial and ethnic minority groups must also be
collected regarding underserved rural populations.54 The data must be available to relevant
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federal administrative bodies, such as Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services (“CMS”).55
The Secretary must report the data through the HHS website, and she may make the data
available for further research to non-governmental entities and the public.56 These national
requirements will apply to data collection under state plans and SCHIP as well.57
This type of data collection and dissemination effort is best done at the national level to
capture the greatest amount of reliable data and to minimize administrative costs. Because of the
way that HHS must collect the data, this effort will shed greater light not only on national
healthcare trends, but on local ones as well. Because the national government shoulders a
significant portion of healthcare costs, it alone has the proper incentives to collect and to
disseminate data as well as to encourage states and regulated industries to solve the demonstrated
problems.
The ACA also seeks to promote wellness and prevention through targeted redistribution
and experimentation. These national efforts can reach a broader population while ensuring that
local needs are addressed. The law establishes the Prevention and Public Health Fund—a
dedicated national funding mechanism administered by HHS that will “provide for [an]
expanded and sustained national investment in prevention and public health programs to improve
health and help restrain the rate of growth” of health care costs.58 The fund began with $500
million in 2010 and will grow to two billion dollars by 2015.59
In addition to the Fund, the ACA mandates the Secretary of HHS to award competitive
“community transformation grants” to state and local governmental agencies and to communitybased organizations that want to implement evidence-based community preventive health plans
to reduce chronic disease rates and to address health disparities across the country.60 In creating
this section, Congress appears to have been focused on ensuring that experimentation will bear
fruit because the law requires the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to
provide a literature review and to establish the framework for evaluating the plans as part of the
grant program. The Director must also “work[] with academic institutions or other entities with
expertise in outcome evaluation.”61 Grantees must meet at least annually to discuss “best
55
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practices” and “lessons learned,” and they must “develop models for the replication of successful
programs and activities and the mentoring of other eligible entities.”62 Unlike experimentation
through Medicaid waivers, these grants can rely on private organizations that are not bound by
state borders, and the regulatory structure ensures that a national agency is charged with
collecting results from the experiments. Depending on the degree of latitude afforded to the state
agencies, this program could become another example, like Medicare demonstration projects, of
useful national experimentation.
A similar focus on evaluation is also in place for the ACA’s authorization of HHS grants
to state and local health departments and Indian tribes to carry out five-year pilot programs to
improve the health of Americans from fifty-five to sixty-four years of age.63 Small employers
may also receive HHS grants, but the ACA does not contain statutory language requiring
national agencies to evaluate results of those experiments. These small employer grants will go
toward providing employees with “comprehensive workplace wellness programs,” as defined by
HHS, but these grants must be “based on and consistent with evidence-based research and best
practices.”64
B. Medicaid Expansion
The ACA uses Medicaid as a primary vehicle to expand healthcare to the uninsured.
Although the law has brought greater consistency to the program by nationalizing eligibility
standards and increasing national funding, the ACA nevertheless perpetuates the cooperative
federalist structure. States remain largely responsible for implementation or, in their view, left
with problems like managing enrollment and controlling costs.65 The only silver lining to the
ACA’s failures may be that its reforms have inched the ball closer to nationalizing Medicaid.
Before the ACA, only limited categories of low-income individuals—children, pregnant
women, the disabled, and seniors—were eligible for Medicaid. Because of the program’s
cooperative federalist structure, states had the discretion to expand eligibility requirements,
subject to federal rules. Consequently, Medicaid eligibility varied state to state, and the program
was an uneven safety net dependent on state political will, policy preferences, and budgets.
The ACA replaces that patchwork with a more uniform and equitable standard. Starting
in 2014, nearly all individuals under sixty-five with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty
level will be eligible for Medicaid. By streamlining eligibility requirements, the ACA opens
Medicaid (and SCHIP) to about sixteen million new people, which raises the cost of
administering the program.66 To pay for this expansion, the national government significantly
increased its share of Medicaid funding through the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage
(“FMAP”). Specifically, to cover the care of the “newly eligible,” states will see FMAP cover
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100% of the differential from 2014 to 2016, 95% in 2017, and 90% in 2020 and thereafter.67
This increased national contribution ensures that poorer states receive some redistributive
assistance in reaching the floor of acceptable coverage. Additionally, to help poorer states
bolster their minimum floor of healthcare, the ACA will also increase FMAP, “subject to various
requirements, . . . for certain disaster-affected states, primary care payment rate increases,
specified preventive services and immunizations, smoking cessation services for pregnant
women, specified home and community-based services, and health home services for certain
people with chronic conditions.”68
Lawmakers correctly realized that this dramatic increase in Medicaid coverage would
require greater national contributions to offset the states’ costs. The increase in national funding
is a good thing; state budgetary constraints and shortfalls made it unlikely for states to raise their
minimum level of healthcare. Unfortunately, except to cover the care of the “newly eligible,” the
FMAP funding mechanism is only partial assistance. The states must still balance federal
financial incentives against their own needs and will probably continue to scale back coverage to
the poor during economic downturns.
Additionally, fully nationalizing the funding of Medicaid would have given the national
government more power to control costs and run experiments as it does in Medicare. If
Medicaid waivers have taught us anything, it is that state experimentation in this program
teaches us very little.69 The system, rather than a thoughtfully structured process to produce and
replicate good policy nationwide, has become a vehicle for states to execute their individual
preferences haphazardly under lax federal supervision and an instrument for the national
government to push its agenda without regard to useful experimentation.70
In other respects, the ACA exemplifies the national government’s potential for
experimentation and innovation. The statute orders the Secretary of HHS to establish four
different demonstration projects: (1) a project on the use of bundled payments for the provision
of integrated care around hospitalization,71 (2) a project on hospital payments under a global
capitation payment model,72 (3) a project authorizing states to allow qualified pediatric medical
providers to be recognized as an accountable care organization,73 and (4) a project requiring
states to make payments to an institution of mental diseases for certain services for Medicaid
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beneficiaries between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-five.74 Each project has different
provisions on how HHS, or other entities, is supposed to evaluate and report the resulting data.75
The ACA’s efforts regarding Medicaid benefits, however, are to some extent
disappointing. The ACA does not require states to offer full Medicaid benefits to the “newly
eligible.”76 Instead, the “newly eligible” will receive limited benefits packages commonly
referred to as benchmark or benchmark-equivalent plans.77 In 2005, Congress gave states the
flexibility to create these benefit packages as a way to reduce federal entitlement spending. 78
Benchmark plans need only be equivalent to coverage under the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program (“FEHBP”), coverage offered to state employees, an HMO Plan that has the
largest insured commercial (non-Medicaid) enrollment in the state, or any coverage approved by
the Secretary of HHS as meeting the needs of the population to be covered.79 At the same time,
apparently aware of how varied these benchmark plans could be, the ACA does attempt to bring
some uniformity and redistributive effect to the Medicaid benefits of the “newly eligible.” It
requires that benchmark plans include “essential health benefits,”80 and they are also required to
cover prescription drugs and mental health services.81
Ultimately, however, the ACA’s approach to Medicaid does not harness enough of the
national government’s advantage in healthcare regulation. Once again, state implementation will
dampen the advantages of national administration. The differences between full Medicaid
benefits and benchmark plans may be difficult not only for Medicaid beneficiaries who see a
change in their circumstances,82 but also for the states who must deal with the administrative
headaches. The variance in funding—a significantly greater FMAP for the newly-eligibles than
the pre-PPACA Medicaid population—may also create administrative troubles for the states in
addition to the differentials in healthcare access and quality among the poor. In short, the
greatest disappointment is that ACA forewent an opportunity to turn Medicaid into a fully
national program like Medicare. Public insurance benefits from economies of scale, and national
programs can still experiment. The Medicare model is functionally superior.
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C. Private Insurance Regulations
The ACA contains numerous regulations designed to overhaul the private insurance
market in favor of greater coverage and consumer protections. These rules best reflect the
national government’s ability to prevent “races to the bottom” and to set uniform standards to
level the marketplace, foster competition, and benefit the consumer. For example, the ACA
requires the Secretary of HHS, along with National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(“NAIC”), to develop national standards for group health plans and health insurance issuers to
use in their summaries and explanations of their plans’ benefits and coverage.83 These standards
must detail a uniform format, standard definitions, the required content, and they must be subject
to periodic review.84
The ACA also establishes an “essential health benefits package,” that must be available
to consumers through the exchanges in 2014.85 This provision gives the federal government the
power to determine and standardize a federal floor that guarantees a minimum level of benefits.
The new law contains several services that it lists as mandatory, such as ambulatory patient
services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and
substance use disorder services, prescription drugs, rehabilitative services and devices,
laboratory services, preventive and wellness services, and pediatric services.86 Currently, only
twenty-four states mandate standardized plans in their small group markets while just twelve
states have standardized plans in their individual markets.87
The Secretary of HHS must ensure that the scope of the benefits is equivalent to “a
typical employer plan,” and she must factor several enumerated criteria in determining the
package (e.g., the balance of benefits and the health needs of diverse segments of the
population). She must also periodically review and report to Congress whether modifying the
package is needed.88 Qualified health plans must offer at least one “silver level” plan (benefits
that are actuarially equivalent to seventy percent of the full actuarial value) and at least one “gold
level” plan (benefits that are actuarially equivalent to eighty percent of the full actuarial value).89
The ACA also explicitly prohibits the practice of rescission, or post-claims
underwriting.90 State laws governing rescission, guaranteed-issue, and preexisting conditions
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varied dramatically pre-ACA.91 Prior to the ACA’s passage, only five states required any health
insurer to accept every applicant, only one state required state pre-approval of rescissions, and
more than half a dozen states failed to define preexisting condition entirely.92 Congress found
that most states “were unable to answer basic questions about rescissions” occurring in their
individual insurance markets.93 Under this fractured regulatory environment, some insurers
aggressively rescinded coverage, often linking employee bonuses to canceling coverage despite
affecting innocent policyholders.94 In fact, before the ACA’s passage, some insurance
companies pointedly refused to limit rescissions only to policyholders who fraudulently obtain
coverage.95
The ACA correctly replaces the mess with a simpler standard: a bar on group health plans
and issuers in individual markets from rescinding coverage except in situations of fraud or
intentional misrepresentation.96 The current law also permits states to be more protective than
the new federal floor, and it requires prior notice—at least thirty calendar days—before coverage
can be retroactively discontinued.97
The ACA also establishes a national minimum medical loss ratio (“MLR”) requirement.
Prior to the ACA, only “a handful of states” required a MLR of seventy-five percent from
individual or small-group insurers.98 Large group plans must now meet a MLR of eighty-five
percent, while individual and small group plans must hit eighty percent.99 States can establish a
higher MLR if they choose, though the Secretary of HHS may adjust the rates “on account of the
volatility of the individual market” in each state.100 Insurers must submit annual reports of their
costs and earned premiums to the Secretary, and those that fail to meet the relevant MLR must
issue annual rebates to their policyholders on a pro rata basis.101 HHS has already issued an
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interim final rule that details the reporting and rebate requirements as well as the enforcement
mechanisms.102
Another immediate reform of the ACA is the ability of the Secretary of HHS to review
insurance premium increases. The law orders the Secretary, “in conjunction with the states,” to
establish an annual review of “unreasonable” premium increases.103 Insurers that seek
“unreasonable” increases must justify their plans and must disclose their justifications
prominently on their website. HHS has issued a proposed rule stating that for 2011,it will review
increases of ten percent or more.104 Beyond 2011, the review will either remain at ten percent or
be at a state-specific threshold established by the Secretary.105 Yet even with this review
process, HHS cannot reject the proposed increases; insurers that unreasonably increase their
premiums only need to submit a final justification.106 A final determination as to whether they
can go through with the increase will depend on state law.107
These ACA provisions represent a significant step forward in the national regulation of
insurance. Yet, upon closer examination, a less positive picture appears. Despite the
establishment of national standards, much of the law depends on state implementation and
enforcement. Aware of this issue, the NAIC conducted several surveys “in an attempt to
determine states’ ability to enforce the federal consumer protections scheduled to become
effective plan years beginning on or after September 23, 2010.”108 In a letter to Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius, NAIC lauded the fact that “almost half of the states have concluded that they
have the ability to enforce the federal law either through explicit state laws or general powers
granted to the commissioner.”109 It also stressed that “almost all states can use their form
approval process, investigative powers, and/or market conduct exam authority to hold licensed
insurers accountable for their compliance with the federal laws.”110 The NAIC concluded that
these efforts, “combined with coordinated enforcement by the federal regulators, should be
sufficient to ensure carriers comply with the new requirements.”111
Although the NAIC couched its survey results positively, there is still reason for concern.
That “[a]lmost half of the states” can enforce these national standards means more than half
cannot. For these states, how aggressively will they hold insurers accountable? Without a
centralized effort, enforcement will be spotty and recalcitrant states may undo the newly
achieved national standard. In fact, in the NAIC survey, Arizona responded, “In light of our
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state’s participation in the multi-state lawsuit over the [ACA], it seems unlikely that [we] will
pass legislation expressly authorizing any agency to enforce the [ACA] in the near future.”112
Moreover, in 2009, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer instituted an indefinite rule-making
moratorium, explaining that the state had “no plans to adopt rules related to [ACA]
enforcement.”113
With regard to reviewing increases in health insurance premiums, inconsistent state
enforcement is already emerging due to different state practices, resources, and regulatory
authority.114 Furthermore, the HHS-proposed rule suggests that the national government will not
be an independent source of aggressive enforcement. Instead, the rule places HHS in a
deferential posture to the states, stating that the ACA provision “only supplement[s] and
complement[s], rather than supplant[s], and do[es] not interfere with, existing State laws and
processes for rate review.”115 As long as a state has an effective rate review program, as
determined by HHS, HHS will “adopt [the state’s] determination and will not conduct an
independent review of the state’s determination.”116
If HHS rulemakers believe all states will implement this national standard effectively,
they are too optimistic. Last December, the Kaiser Family Foundation released a fifty-state
survey in which they highlighted the drastically different approaches that states have toward rate
review.117 The report made several discomforting conclusions. Notably, most states make “little
or no effort to make rate filings transparent” and “[m]any states lack the capacity and resources
to conduct an adequate review.”118
Oddly, Congress recognized that states would have difficulty implementing this provision
because the ACA authorizes HHS to dole out grant money for states to strengthen their rate
review programs until 2014. In August 2010, HHS issued the first of these grants, totaling $46
million to forty-five states and the District of Columbia.119 Based on what these states plan to do
with the money, such as increasing the transparency and the scope of the rate review process, it
appears the states also recognize that they currently lack sufficient authority. The states should
take this opportunity and money to better their processes for enforcement of the provision.
Not all provisions, however, have accompanying grants for states. While states may be
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better rate reviewers, other federal standards will go under-enforced.120 For all its
groundbreaking, the ACA should not have ceded so much to state implementation.
D. Exchanges
Finally, the ACA embraces a muddled federalism as its structure for the new, post-reform
health insurance market. Instead of creating a national insurance market for consumers and
insurers alike, the ACA creates state-based insurance exchanges that may distort the regulatory
effects of its reforms and hamper Americans’ ability to obtain coverage. The current framework
may have been necessary as a matter of politics, but it is flawed as a matter of policy.
Implementing state-based exchanges prioritizes cooperative federalism at the expense of
fulfilling the legislation’s policy goals effectively.
1. The Framework Behind the State-Based Exchanges
The ACA mandates each state to create an “American Health Benefit Exchange” to
“facilitate[ ] the purchase of qualified health plans” by 2014.121 Each state must also create a
“Small Business Health Options Program,” or SHOP exchange, for employers with 100 or fewer
employees to enroll their employees in qualified health plans.122 The two exchanges may be
combined “only if [a combined exchange] has adequate resources to assist” both individuals and
small employers.123 All exchanges must be run by a state government agency or a stateestablished nonprofit entity.124 The establishment of exchanges does not prohibit health
insurance issuers from offering nor individuals and employers from enrolling in health plans
outside of the exchanges.125 Nevertheless, issuers must treat individuals inside and outside the
exchange as part of a single risk pool.126 This rule applies to small employers inside and outside
of the exchange as well.127
Each exchange must execute, among other responsibilities, a rating system for each
qualified health plan it offers, a website for consumers to compare plans, and a system to inform
potential enrollees of their eligibility for SCHIP, Medicare, or other state and local programs.128
The law requires the Secretary of HHS to issue grants to states as seed money to help establish
their exchanges, but this funding ends by 2015.129 After 2015, the exchanges must be self120
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sustaining.130 If a state fails to establish an exchange, or meet all the standards, the Secretary
must “directly or through agreement with a not-for-profit entity . . . establish and operate” an
exchange within the state.131
The Secretary has the power to issue regulations with respect to the establishment and
operation of the state exchanges, the offering of qualified health plans, and other such related
requirements.132 Additionally, she has the power to investigate each exchange for fraud and
abuse and she must conduct annual audits of each exchange.133 The Secretary’s oversight is
coupled with the requirement that each exchange submit an annual accounting.134 The Secretary
also maintains the power to establish, by regulation, the criteria for certifying health plans as
qualified health plans.135 The criteria must, among other things, require minimum marketing
requirements, ensure a sufficient choice of providers, and insist on certain qualify accreditation
measures.136 Furthermore, the Secretary must develop a rating system for the plans at each
benefits level based on relative quality and price.137 Nevertheless, it is ultimately each exchange
that will certify the plans in a manner consistent with the Secretary’s guidelines.138 Thus, each
state may require additional benefits to be offered, but it would be responsible for the cost.139
To ensure that consumers have options, the ACA contemplates the creation and
regulation of nonprofit health insurance issuers under the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan
(“CO-OP”) Program.140 The Secretary of HHS must award grants and loans toward the creation
of these nonprofits in each state.141 If a nonprofit issuer fails to take hold in a state, the Secretary
may use CO-OP appropriated funds to encourage the establishment of a nonprofit issuer or the
expansion of another state’s qualified nonprofit issuer into the state.142
On the other hand, the new law also provides tremendous flexibility for states to establish
alternative programs and options within, and in place of, insurance plans offered in their
exchanges. For example, subject to HHS certification, states can establish basic health programs
for low-income individuals ineligible for Medicaid rather than offer plans through their own
exchanges for these individuals.143 If they abide by certain qualifications, states can create
subsidiary exchanges within their states.144 In 2016, upon HHS approval, two or more states can
enter into interstate “health care choice compacts” that would allow qualified health plans to be
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sold and bought across state lines.145 And in 2017, states can apply for waivers from the federal
requirements if they can show that they can “provide coverage that is at least as comprehensive
[and affordable] as the coverage . . . offered through [state exchanges].”146
Finally, in place of a public health insurance program, known during the health care
reform debate as a “public option,” the ACA gives the Office of Personnel Management
(“OPM”), a federal body that administers the health insurance plans for federal workers, the
ability to sponsor nationwide health plans.147 The law mandates that the Director of the OPM
contract with health insurance issuers to offer at least two multi-state qualified health plans
through each state exchange.148 At least one of the issuers must be a non-profit entity.149
Furthermore, like with the federal employees health benefit program, the Director has the power
to negotiate the medical loss ratio, the profit margin, the premiums, and “other terms and
conditions of coverage . . . in the interests of enrollees” with each health insurance issuer.150 The
plans must meet all the minimum benefits requirements established elsewhere by this bill, and
States can require additional benefits if they cover the costs.151
2. Criticism
Despite lodging some necessary power with the Secretary of HHS, this state-centric
framework contains several flaws. First, because this legislation places the initial burden on
states to create the exchanges, every state’s political process will now become another politicized
forum for health care opponents to delay or hinder the effort toward universal health care. In
other words, rather than closing the book on political fights and moving toward implementation
or execution of a national exchange, this country will be headed for more political battles, fought
at the state level, over the design and implementation of state-based exchanges.152 Lawmakers in
over half the states have already begun to fight against what they perceive to be the overreach of
federal power.153 This past year, the governors in six states fought their state attorneys general
over whether to join the lawsuit challenging the individual mandate requirement.154 In states
where conservative activists have succeeded in blocking or slowing down state implementation
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bills, governors and insurance commissioners are looking to implement the ACA by skirting
their legislatures through executive power.155 Ironically, rather than wanting to overreach, the
Senate purposely chose a framework of state-based exchanges precisely because several key
Senators believed that states should have the flexibility in creating their own plans.156 Yet,
because of this leeway, those fundamentally opposed to health care reform now have a prime
opportunity to block reform efforts.157
Second, state autonomy and flexibility may end up creating counterproductive solutions,
which under the new law would simply return the problem back to the federal government.158 In
establishing a “hierarchy between the federal and state governments” and having the states
enforce and uphold exchange responsibilities, the federal government is pushing the costs onto
the states without providing them with any resources to maintain their duties except initial startup money.159 The framework passed by the House, which gave states the option to create their
own exchanges only if they could show that such exchanges would be stable, is a better approach
and should have been adopted instead. It would have guarded against failed state
experimentation while still providing ambitious states the room to innovate. Such a framework
treats the federal government and the states as partners, “not as either underlings or wholly
independent sovereigns.”160 While the federal government implements, enforces, and pays the
national exchange through a new federal agency, states remain responsible for their traditional
duties, such as insurer licensure and solvency, as well as enforcement of its own laws on behalf
of consumers.161
Third, state-based exchanges are problematic because “[e]fforts by the states to establish
open exchanges have largely failed.”162 Even among the more recent ones, Massachusetts’s
exchange has seen qualified success. Nearly everyone in Massachusetts now has health
insurance, but the state has not succeeded in controlling costs effectively.163 Massachusetts’s
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record should be understood in light of earlier “fairly significant reforms” that the state
undertook before establishing the exchange.164
Relatedly, cooperatives designed to help small businesses purchase insurance failed in the
1990s because they were never able to command any more than a small portion of the market,
giving them little negotiation power and few options to choose from.165 Moreover, insurers
began to select among firms, “signing up all the small business with generally health employees
and offloading the bad risks—companies with older or sicker employees—onto the exchange.”166
Premiums increased, and both insurers and small businesses began to leave.167
Fourth, the size of the risk pool is a significant factor. Unless an exchange offers a
sufficiently sized market, issuers can, and will, take their products elsewhere. Yet, the very
problem with state-based exchanges is the “risk that some smaller states may not have large
enough risk pools.”168 A stable exchange should not only have a minimum size of 100,000
people but it should also have at least twenty to twenty-five percent of non-Medicaid/nonMedicare populations in the coverage pool.169 Before the final bill’s passage, some experts even
suggested giving the Secretary the power to consolidate exchanges in order to achieve the
100,000-person threshold to counter the effects of adverse selection.170 At least one former
governor was quick to realize that his state will need to join neighboring ones to be an effective
exchange. Former West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin has said, “The borders don’t separate
where the care might be given, and I have five borders . . . . We’re going to work in conjunction
with our fellow states, with our fellow governors, to make the best delivery system and the best
economy that we can.”171
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Fifth, programs similar to the forthcoming exchanges that have succeeded are national.172
Administered by OPM, the FEHBP is “the largest single purchaser of health insurance benefits”
in this country outside of Medicare and a “widely cited example of an exchange-like system.”173
FEHBP offers federal employees and their families, who number over eight million, the option to
choose from numerous health insurance plans negotiated in part by OPM.174 Unfortunately, the
legislation does not explicitly give exchanges the power to negotiate directly, unlike the House
bill.175 The many different state-based exchanges are also unlikely to secure the savings in
administrative costs that a national exchange can achieve.176
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the ACA accomplishes significantly greater centralization of authority for
healthcare regulation, it falls far short of the full centralization that seems functionally justified.
There is no doubt that the states have played an important role in healthcare regulation
throughout the nation’s history, but that role is becoming increasingly irrelevant as healthcare
regulation becomes increasingly technocratic—i.e., increasingly objectivist and data-driven. The
ACA is a step in the right direction, but the U.S. should further centralize authority over
healthcare.
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